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I. INTRODUCTION
Unquestionably, the Ninth Circuit panel in Robinson v.
Ariyoshi' agonized over the final result. The appeal from the
district court was filed in 1977. The Ninth Circuit issued its de-
cision affirming the lower court opinion in 1985. Between these
two dates, the Ninth Circuit convened two panels to hear the
case, held three different hearings and even certified questions
of state law to the Hawaii Supreme Court. The issue that made
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Hawaii, A.B. Princeton University, 1972;
J.D. Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley, 1975. Member Califor-
nia and Hawaii Bars. The author was a special deputy attorney general representing the
Chief Justice of the Hawaii Supreme Court in the case discussed in this article, Robinson
v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985) petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S.
Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-406), and filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the Chief
Justice and participated in two of the oral arguments before the Ninth Circuit. The au-
thor is no longer participating in the case and wishes to emphasize that the views ex-
pressed in this article are solely his own and do not represent the opinions of any agency
with which he may be associated. The author would like to thank Jason Yoshida, third-
year law student at the University of Hawaii School of Law, for his assistance on this
article. The author also wishes to acknowledge the assistance, financial and otherwise, of
the Water Resources Research Center of the University of Hawaii, which has made pos-
sible my research in the area of Hawaiian water rights. A shorter version of this article
appeared first in the Winter 1986 issue of the Western Natural Resource Litigation Di-
gest, which has subsequently ceased publication.
1. 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S.
Sept. 10, 1985) (85-406).
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this case so difficult was not that the case related to Hawaiian
water rights, but rather that it focused on the constitutionality
of retroactive changes in the law-an issue that has also sur-
faced recently in California cases involving the public trust doc-
trine.2 In Robinson v. Ariyoshi, the Ninth Circuit upheld the ac-
tion of the lower federal court' in voiding a state supreme court
decision that allegedly had overruled earlier precedents. Prior to
the district court's injunction, the decision of the Hawaii Su-
preme Court in McBryde v. Robinson,4 had been appealed to the
United States Supreme Court and certiorari had been denied.'
The retroactive overruling of prior decisions, and the pro-
cess of judicial change in general, has always been a difficult
phenomena for courts to explain. The conventional Blackstonian
explanation must seem nonsensical to the non-lawyer. The law
was viewed as a "brooding omnipresence" in the sky.' The judge
simply recorded what he saw. The fact that a decision might be
overruled was explained on the basis that later judges had a
clearer, more accurate view of the law. Thus, it was not the law
that had changed, but rather the "clouds" or whatever obscured
the judicial vision which had changed. This Blackstonian view of
the law preserves the fiction that the judge has no active role in
shaping the law. He does not make law. He declares what law
is.7 However patently transparent this explanation may seem, it
is nevertheless a necessary premise of contemporary thinking.
Any other explanation brings one to the conclusion that it is the
judge who changes the law. If judges change law, however, they
inevitably must be said to create and destroy property rights.
Arguably, as asserted in Robinson v. Ariyoshi, such action is the
equivalent of a taking that requires just compensation.
The Ninth Circuit confronted these issues in Robinson v.
2. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709,
189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 466 U.S. 977 (1983); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court,
26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980).
3. 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977).
4. 54 Hawaii 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, cert. denied and
appeal dismissed sub nom. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Hawaii, 417 U.S. 962 (1974).
5. 417 U.S. 962 (1974).
6. This is Holmes' sarcastic phrase. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,
222 (1916) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally, Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Pro-
spective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 2 (1960).
7. Id.
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Ariyoshi, a case that has wide ranging implications concerning
the relationship between federal and state courts.' However, the
rationale and reasoning of the Ninth Circuit misses the boat.
The result reached by the court threatens to subordinate state
supreme courts to the powers of federal district courts in areas
of traditional state law concern.'
This article is divided into five parts. The Background sec-
tion provides an overview to the McBryde v. Robinson and
Robinson v. Ariyoshi decisions. McBryde v. Robinson is the 1973
Hawaii Supreme Court decision that allegedly changed the law
of surface water rights in Hawaii. Robinson v. Ariyoshi is the
Ninth Circuit opinion that affirmed a district court decision
voiding the Hawaii Supreme Court's McBryde decision.
The next section Doctrinal Pathology, is a study of the
Ninth Circuit decision, examining how three false assumptions
by the Ninth Circuit allowed the court to avoid the application
of a number of doctrines designed to forestall the use of lower
federal courts as appellate courts of the state. The three incor-
rect premises used by the court were, first, that the constitution-
ality of a final state judgment constituted a new and separate
cause of action different from the underlying claim.10 Second,
that the appellate court's declaration of law constituted "state
action" for the purpose of the fourteenth amendment." Third,
8. There are several ramifications of the type of collateral attack in Robinson v.
Ariyoshi. First, the United States Supreme Court would no longer perform its role as the
exclusive appellate court for state judgments. Second, state court decisions would have
no finality. Third, state courts would no longer be the final arbiters of state law. See
generally, Chang, Unraveling Robinson v. Ariyoshi: Can Courts 'Take' Property? 2 U.
HAWAII L. REV. 57, 58-59 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Chang, Unraveling Robinson]. See
also, O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from
the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 (1981).
9. Id. at 59.
10. Id. at 89-90.
11. The federal district court in Robinson v. Ariyoshi cited the Supreme Court's
decision in Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 690 (1930) for the proposition that
state judicial action can violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 441
F. Supp. at 580 (D. Hawaii 1977). The brief of McBryde Sugar Company before the
Ninth Circuit asserts that appellate decisionmaking can violate the fourteenth amend-
ment on the basis of Shelley v. Kraemer:
Furthermore, the just compensation clause is made applicable
to the states by the fourteenth amendment, and it has always
been the law that the state action, which Section 1 of that
Amendment restricts, comprehends action by 'its legislative,
its executive, or its judicial authorities.' Ex parte Virginia, 100
19861
126 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:123
that the rules enunciated in a judicial decision could create
vested rights that were protected from later changes in the law
by the just compensation clause.12 These three assumptions al-
lowed the court to arrive at a bizarre result, giving federal dis-
trict courts the power to set aside state supreme court decisions
in the area of state property law, even after the state judgment
had been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court.
The third section, The Layman's View of a Taking, seeks to
explain why the Ninth Circuit felt compelled to reach so far for
this odd result. In the next section, Change and Due Process:
The Myth, this article discusses the philosophical difficulties in
explaining change in the law. The Conclusion notes the effect of
political and social change in Hawaii on the development of
water rights law.
II. BACKGROUND
McBryde v. Robinson involved a question of water rights in
Hawaii. In 1959, various parties, including the state, sued each
other in state court for a determination of their respective water
rights. The parties had previously litigated some aspects of their
claim. The parties proceeded to trial and obtained a state trial
court judgment that apportioned the water according to Hawai-
ian water rights believed to be in effect at the time: 1) konohiki
water rights (rights derived from the ownership of land upon
which waters arise),18 2) prescriptive water rights 4 and 3) ap-
U.S. 339, 347 (1880); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 17
(1883); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1948).
Answering Brief of McBryde Sugar Co., Ltd., at 23, Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468
(9th Cir. 1985).
12. With the exception of Muhiker v. New York and Harlem R. Co., 197 U.S. 544
(1905), the Supreme Court has held that there are no property rights in the decisions of
courts and changes in law are not a deprivation of due process. See Central Land Co. v.
Laidley, 159 U.S. 103 (1895); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924); Dunbar v.
City of New York, 251 U.S. 516 (1920); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). See
generally Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 68-71.
13. Konohiki water rights are defined as rights to the normal surplus waters in a
stream. The sugar companies contended that the proper rule in Hawaii was that the
owner of the lands that were owned by the konohiki was also the owner of the normal
surplus waters. The case of Hawaii Commercial Sugar Co. v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 15 Ha-
waii 675 (1904) is cited for that proposition. However, the Hawaii Supreme Court in
answering the certified questions requested by the Ninth Circuit held that Hawaiian
Commercial should not be given this reading. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Hawaii 641,
669-70, 658 P.2d 287, 307 (1982). In reviewing 125 years of case law on the issue of ko-
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purtenant water rights (a unique Hawaiian water right that
grants the owner of land a right to a fixed quantity of water)."6
Up until this point the case was an ordinary action to allocate
the waters. However, when the Hawaii Supreme Court decided
the case on appeal, it challenged the premise upon which the
parties had brought the action: that surface water in Hawaii
could be privately "owned." 6 While there is no serious talk
about private ownership of the corpus of water in other states,
some parties contended that Hawaiian law allowed parties to
"own" the physical corpus of water. In other western states,
when one speaks of "owning water," one is really communicating
a notion of ownership of the right to use water.17 In Hawaii, law-
yers have argued that Hawaiian law is unique in providing for
the ownership of water.
The importance of the concept of private ownership of
water becomes clear when one considers the two important rul-
ings made by the Hawaii Supreme Court. First, the court stated
that, except for appurtenant and riparian rights, the state was
the "owner" of all surface waters.18 Second, the court stated that
no one could transfer water from one watershed to another."
Given the notion of private ownership of water in Hawaii
that existed at the time, the court's assertion that the state was
the true "owner" of water seemed to place title to the water in
the state. Hence, this judicial declaration appeared to take prop-
erty. Furthermore, the court's rule against transferring water
from one watershed to another was potentially disruptive in that
nohiki rights, the Hawaii Supreme Court stated that konohiki water rights were not
rights to a fixed body of water: "Surplus water, as discussed in our cases, did not present
a right to a fixed quantity of water; it was the residuum of the waters in a natural water-
course after the rights of others had been accounted for." Id. at 672, 658 P.2d at 309.
14. Prescriptive water rights refer to rights acquired against other parties on princi-
ples similar to that of adverse possession. See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Ha-
waii 174, 198, 504 P.2d 1330, 1344-45 (1973).
15. Appurtenant water rights are rights to take the amount of water historically
needed to grow taro. Id. at 187-91, 504 P.2d at 1339-41.
16. See supra note 13. The sugar companies based their action on the rule that the
owner of the lands formerly held by the konohiki was the owner of the normal surplus
waters of the stream.
17. See generally, Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45
CAL. L. REv. 638 (1957).
18. 54 Hawaii at 200, 504 P.2d at 1345-46.
19. Id.
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it would terminate the flow of water in many of the irrigation
ditches that served the sugar industry.2"
Subsequent to the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision, it ap-
peared that the only water rights left in Hawaii were riparian
and appurtenant rights. Both required the use of the water only
on the land that gave rise to the right. Konohiki water
rights-the rights to the vast bulk of surface waters-no longer
existed. The state was now the "owner" of these waters and as
such, no one else could transfer the waters without state
permission.
A western water lawyer coming upon this scene would be
somewhat amused. First, this talk of ownership of water would
seem quite odd.21 Second, this view of so-called "state owner-
ship" of water would not appear all that threatening. In the
west, statements of "state ownership" of water have been
treated as the equivalent of the state power to regulate and
manage the water.22 Indeed, prior appropriation exists where
state constitutions or state statutes assert that the state is the
owner of all waters. 2
In all fairness, the Hawaii Supreme Court did qualify its
statement that the state was the owner of all waters. In a foot-
note it explained that it meant to convey the notion of publici
juris.24 Indeed, if the court truly meant that the state held the
waters as publici juris, or in other words, merely as an assertion
of the government's power to regulate, then the state did not
receive anything more than what the state already had under
the police power. Thus, the contentious litigation since then may
be much ado about nothing.2 6
20. The lower federal court in Robinson v. Ariyoshi made the following findings of
fact: "The sugar lands, if unirrigated, would be appraised as 'very poor pasture,' at an
assessed value of $8 an acre, or $4 if dedicated to agricultural use. In contrast, 'cane'
lands are assessed at $666 an acre (or $333 if dedicated), indicating $951.42 an acre as a
sound value." 441 F. Supp. at 575.
21. See Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L.
REv. 638 (1957).
22. Id. at 643-45.
23. Id. at 644.
24. 54 Hawaii at 187 n.13, 504 P.2d at 1339 n.13.
25. See Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 91:
When it comes to writing an epitaph for Robinson v. Ariyoshi
as it concerns Hawaii water rights, one might fittingly pirate
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The parties, nevertheless, treated the decision in McBryde
as if it transferred corporeal ownership from private parties to
the state. The state through its attorney general, seemingly ac-
quiesced in this understanding, perhaps on the theory that cor-
poreal ownership would maximize the state's power to regulate.
The practical effect of this de facto stipulation between the state
and the private parties regarding the meaning of "state owner-
ship" was to set the stage for the taking claim. Thus, the private
parties characterized their cause of action against the state in
district court as an original claim, and not an appeal of the Mc-
Bryde decision. The effect was to attack the state supreme court
judgment in a federal district court.
First, however, the losing parties sought a rehearing before
the Hawaii Supreme Court. The sugar companies wanted to pre-
sent evidence of the devastating effect that the Hawaii Supreme
Court rulings would have on their industry. Any ruling that gave
the state the right to force the sugar companies to buy back wa-
ters clearly presented a frightening prospect. The Hawaii Su-
preme Court granted the rehearing but limited the argument to
non-constitutional questions. The court confined the rehearing
to the applicability of the Hawaii statute that was the basis for
the two rulings. 26 Thus, while the sugar companies were able to
present their constitutional claims in the form of a motion for
reconsideration, they were not allowed to present oral argument
or introduce evidence before the supreme court. This limitation
on rehearing later became significant. The federal district court
in Robinson voided the McBryde decision, partly on the grounds
that the refusal of the Hawaii Supreme Court to allow argument
on these constitutional claims was a denial of due process.27
the title: "Much Ado About Nothing." Since the claim was
based on the unjustified assumption that "ownership" in Mc-
Bryde was used in the res publicae sense, the Robinson litiga-
tion seems to have been a waste of resources.
Id.
26. The Hawaii Supreme Court limited reargument to the following points: (1) the
relevance of section 7-1 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes (1968) to the water rights of the
parties, and (2) the legal theories which supported a conclusion that appurtenant water
rights can be used on other parcels. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 55 Hawaii 260, 261,
517 P.2d 26, 27 (1973).
27. As the district court noted in Robinson:
Thereafter on the almost farcical "rehearing," although
the due process issues were urged by the plaintiffs, the court
refused to permit argument thereon or consider the same.
19861
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In a short opinion, the Hawaii Supreme Court reaffirmed its
earlier opinion and denied reconsideration.2 Justice Levinson,
who was formerly in the majority, changed his position and
wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion disagreeing with the court's
interpretation of the ancient statutes that led to the two critical
rulings. He even included his own version of the translation of
critical passages from Hawaiian to English to prove the court's
error in interpretation.2 9
Subsequent to this failure on rehearing, the sugar compa-
nies sought review in the United States Supreme Court and suc-
cinctly presented their claim that the decision in McBryde v.
Robinson was an unconstitutional taking. The Court refused to
review the case.30 There are two different interpretations of the
meaning of this denial of certiorari. The state contends that the
sugar companies had an appropriate opportunity in a federal fo-
rum, the United States Supreme Court, to present their consti-
tutional claims. Hence, subsequent to denial of certiorari, the
McBryde judgment became final and barred any collateral at-
tack in federal district court. On the other hand, the sugar com-
panies argue that the Supreme Court's refusal to hear the case
did not represent adequate review since the parties did not have
a chance to fully argue those claims to the Court. Moreover,
since the Supreme Court grants so few petitions, it could not
serve as an adequate body to review the issues. Thus, the right
to petition for certiorari was not the substitute for adequate fed-
eral fact finding on the effects of the McBryde decision.
The next move by the sugar companies was unprecedented.
The sugar companies, who formerly had been adverse parties in
the McBryde state litigation, joined together as plaintiffs and
sued in federal court alleging a violation of procedural and sub-
Rather, the court extended a clearly pro forma invitation to
the plaintiffs to "prove to us why we were wrong" on issues
and conclusions assumed sua sponte and decided sua sponte
by the court.
On this basis alone the judgment of the court would have
to be declared void. ...
441 F. Supp. at 580.
28. 55 Hawaii 260, 517 P.2d 26 (1973).
29. Id. at 288-91, 517 P.2d at 41-44.
30. 417 U.S. 976, cert. denied and appeal dismissed sub nom. McBryde Sugar Co. v.
Hawaii, 417 U.S. 962 (1974).
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stantive due process.3 Since the eleventh amendment bars suits
against the state in federal courts, the plaintiff sugar companies
had to find appropriate state officials to sue. The governor, at-
torney general and others were named as defendants. The na-
ture of the claim, however, focused on wrongdoing by the Hawaii
Supreme Court. That court had allegedly denied them due pro-
cess by deciding the case in a manner not urged by the parties.
Moreover, it was the Hawaii Supreme Court opinion itself that
allegedly "took" the plaintiffs' property.
No state official, however, had ever considered enforcing the
decision. Indeed, it was not yet final and required remand to the
trial court.32 Nor was there any indication that the state desired
to sell the water. To the state's water managers, the idea of sell-
ing "state owned" water must have seemed somewhat far-
fetched. The primary responsibility of these officials was to con-
serve and manage the water. The state did not need
"ownership" of water to assert those powers. The state already
possessed those powers in the form of a groundwater manage-
ment statute. Thus, if anyone inflicted harm on the sugar com-
panies, it was clearly the justices of the Hawaii Supreme Court.
Under the "taking" theory, the Supreme Court of Hawaii should
have been named defendants. Under the plaintiffs' theory of
"taking," the ownership of the water was transferred at the mo-
ment the state supreme court decision was issued. Tactically,
however, naming the state supreme court as a defendant would
have made it clear that the new suit was an appeal of the judg-
ment in McBryde. It is a fundamental rule that federal district
courts should not act as the appellate courts of the state.83 Thus,
31. As the district court noted in Robinson, "The two basic grounds of relief urged
by the plaintiffs are that they were deprived of their property and their water
rights-property rights of great financial value-without either procedural or substantive
due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." 441 F. Supp. at 580.
32. The Hawaii Supreme Court in answering the certified questions from the Ninth
Circuit stated:
For McBryde necessarily left unresolved factual and legal is-
sues that wbuld require a determination by a trial court prior
to any final judgment respecting the distribution of the waters
of the Hanapepe. These include the identification of riparian
lands to which such rights attach and most significantly, the
nature and scope of any remedies to be afforded the parties.
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Hawaii 641 at 653, 658 P.2d 287 at 297.
33. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); see generally Chang,
Rediscovering the Rooker Doctrine: Section 1983, Res Judicata and the Federal Courts,
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instead of proceeding against the court, the plaintiff sugar com-
panies sought to enjoin state officials from enforcing the
decision.
In addition to the substantive due process claim, namely the
taking of water by the McBryde decision, the sugar companies
also based their complaint in federal district court on a number
of procedural due process violations. 84 First, the sugar compa-
nies argued that none of the parties had argued for the result in
McBryde. Thus, the sua sponte nature of the court's decision
violated due process.35 Second, due process was violated when
the Hawaii Supreme Court denied the sugar companies the right
to contest the constitutionality of the McBryde decision on re-
hearing. 6 Third, the plaintiff sugar companies urged that their
rights to due process were violated when the Hawaii Supreme
Court decided an issue allegedly not before the Court: McBryde
held that surface water could not be transported out of the wa-
tershed of its origin. The sugar companies had long relied on the
right to transport surface waters outside of the watershed to cul-
tivate and irrigate sugar lands. Since the original trial court pro-
ceeding in McBryde was limited to the determination of the
ownership of the water, the supreme court's ruling prohibiting
the transportation of water was an alleged violation of proce-
31 HASTINGS L. J. 1337 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Chang, Rooker Doctrine.
34. As the district court stated in Robinson, "As appears above and as decried by
Justice Marumoto in dissent in McBryde I, the effect of the judgment of the Supreme
Court was to deprive the plaintiffs of their property, water and water rights, without
affording any of them an opportunity to be heard in their defense." 441 F. Supp. at 580.
For a discussion of the validity of the due process claims, see generally Chang, Unrav-
eling Robinson, supra note 8, at 78-81.
35. The fact that a rule is declared by a court sua sponte is not reason to consider
the rule a violation of procedural due process. The famous decision of the Supreme
Court that the substantive law of the state should apply in federal diversity actions was
laid down in a sua sponte fashion. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The
opinion of Justice Butler in Erie expresses this point:
No constitutional question was suggested or argued below
or here. And as a general rule, this Court will not consider any
question not raised below and presented by the petition. [Ci-
tations omitted.] Here it does not decide either of the ques-
tions presented but, changing the rule of decision in force
since the foundation of the Government, remands the case to
be adjudged according to a standard never before deemed
permissible.
304 U.S. at 82 (Butler, J., dissenting).
36. The author, in an earlier article, argued that this does not constitute a violation
of procedural due process. See Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 79.
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dural due process.3 7 Finally, a fourth due process violation was
alleged because the Hawaii Supreme Court failed to give res
judicata effect to an earlier case, Territory v. Gay,"8 which alleg-
edly had determined that several of the parties involved in the
present McBryde case were the owners of the water.3"
The formerly adverse private parties who joined as plaintiffs
thus rested their claims on two grounds: a taking of their prop-
erty by the Hawaii Supreme Court and the procedural due pro-
cess violations noted above. The federal district court assumed
jurisdiction. This assumption of jurisdiction ignored both the res
judicata40 effect of the now final state decision and the Rooker"
limitation on federal district courts acting as the appellate
courts of the state. After a short trial, the federal district court
agreed with the plaintiff sugar companies that their constitu-
tional rights had been violated, enjoined the state from enforc-
ing the decision and voided the state supreme court decision in
McBryde v. Robinson.42 In February 1985, after convening two
three-judge panels and holding three separate hearings, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court opinion. 43 The state of
Hawaii sought review of this decision in the United States Su-
preme Court.
On December 9, 1985, the Supreme Court asked the Solici-
tor General of the United States to file briefs expressing the
37. If a court speaks on an issue not before it, the statement would be considered
dicta and not a violation of procedural due process. Id. at 80.
38. 31 Hawaii 376 (1930).
39. The Ninth Circuit in Robinson expressed the view that the decision in Gay,
which was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Territory of Hawaii v. Gay, 52 F.2d 356 (9th
Cir. 1931) created vested water rights for two of the parties in Robinson:
The water law, at least between the territorial government and
the Gay and Robinson interests, thereafter remained settled
until statehood.
Relying upon the decrees in Territory I and II, Gay and
Robinson proceeded with further development of their planta-
tions. . . . By any reasonable interpretation of the word
"vested," Gay and Robinson's rights to the continued use of
their water and related engineering works had become vested.
753 F.2d at 1473-74.
40. See generally, Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 84-90.
41. Id. at 81-83.
42. 441 F. Supp. at 586.
43. 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985).
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view of the United States." This indicates that the issues in-
volved in Robinson v. Ariyoshi are broad in scope and involve
questions of federalism and of constitutional concern. The result
effectuated by the Ninth Circuit must appear quite startling: a
federal district court voiding a final state decision on a question
of traditional concern to the states-water law. Moreover, the
action of the district court, ostensibly justified by the finding of
substantive and procedural due process violations, came after
the aggrieved parties had presented the same arguments to the
Supreme Court and had been denied review.
The action of the Ninth Circuit and the federal district
court is all the more amazing when one considers these two
courts needed to sidestep a number of different doctrines to
reach the result: res judicata, ripeness, sovereign immunity, the
Rooker principle that only the United States Supreme Court
may properly review the constitutionality of decisions of state
supreme courts, and the essential freedom of courts to overrule
earlier precedents.
Another category of objections might be broadly termed
"jurisprudential." This set of objections focuses on the assump-
tion made by the federal district court and the Ninth Circuit
that final judicial decisions such as McBryde v. Robinson "take"
property. This issue is set amidst the ongoing debate as to
whether judges "discover" or "make" the law.45 Robinson v.
Ariyoshi proves that the answer to this question has pragmatic
consequences in terms of modern constitutional law. If jurispru-
dence is founded on a belief that judges discover law and that
changes in the law are reflections of discovering a more accurate
version of the law, then a change in law is not a "taking." The
only premise on which one may even assert that a state supreme
court decision has "taken" the property is one in which judges
44. 106 S. Ct. 565 (1985).
45. Professor Levy makes the following point:
Even today "when a judge invents his own law and con-
cocts his version of the facts, he will not fail to profess obedi-
ence to the accepted tradition." He still purports to be finding
the very law which he has himself laboriously rebraided. The
hold of an inherited legal philosophy controls our mind
against our will and forces us into intellectual circumlocutions
which would shame a medieval schoolman (footnote omitted).
Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 4 (1960).
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are deemed to "make" law.
Largely through the efforts of the legal realists, courts and
commentators have begun to admit the degree to which courts
"make" law. Legal realism is generally viewed as a progressive
movement allowing law to more adequately meet the needs of a
changing society."" The Ninth Circuit's decision represents
ironic misuse of legal realism: the legal realists never thought
that being honest about what courts do would equip parties with
the means of stifling progressive change in law.4
III. DOCTRINAL PATHOLOGY
If one dissects the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, one discovers three premises that led to the final re-
sult. As stated earlier these are 1) that the correctness of a deci-
sion constitutes a new cause of action, 2) that state supreme
court decisions can "take" property, and 3) that the rules of
prior decisions can create vested rights. This article argues that
these three premises are false since they would lead to a lack of
finality in the judicial system. They are inconsistent with the in-
herent requirements of a legal system that must accomplish two
goals-resolve disputes with finality and allow the law to evolve
and change.
Proof of the invalidity of these assumptions is the head-on
conflict of the Ninth Circuit's decision with many of the doc-
trines requiring finality or the proper respect of state court judg-
ments. The following section shows how the result reached in
Robinson v. Ariyoshi required the Ninth Circuit to ignore these
46. Id.
47. The lower federal district court asserted that McBryde v. Robinson was a deci-
sion based on public policy. Since the Hawaii Supreme Court had decided to "make"
instead of "declare" law, its actions could be deemed a taking:
It [the McBryde decision] was strictly a "public-policy" deci-
sion with no prior underlying "legal" justification therefor.
The majority wanted to see streams running down to the sea
on an all-year-around basis. Knowing that this was squarely
contrary to the accepted state of water rights law of Hawaii,
the court first declared that the rule of stare decisis did not
apply to water rights law. In this case stare decisis interfered
with the court's policy.
441 F. Supp. at 566-67.
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doctrines.
A. RIPENESS AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
There were several barriers to federal district court jurisdic-
tion in Robinson v. Ariyoshi. First, a lack of ripeness, since there
was no concrete state action to judge. 8 The state never took any
action to enforce McBryde. Indeed, it could not take such action
since the decision ordered a remand to the state trial court. If
this is true then, the federal district court's action essentially
constituted an injunction against further state judicial proceed-
ings.'9 Moreover, the Hawaii Supreme Court held, in answering
the certified questions from the Ninth Circuit, that the McBryde
decision essentially expressed a declaration of the state's public
trust responsibility over the waters.50 This declaration of public
trust is more akin to a reaffirmation of the police power of the
state to manage and regulate the water than an attempt to
transfer the body of water to the state.
If McBryde merely represented an affirmation of the police
power, then it is even more clear that an action to enjoin state
officers is not ripe.51 The case would only be ripe if, pursuant to
48. In its answers to the certified questions, the Hawaii Supreme Court stated that
the McBryde judgment was not complete and needed to be remanded to the trial court
for a specific allocation of the quantities of water to be accorded the parties. Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 65 Hawaii at 653, 658 P.2d at 297.
49. Under the Younger doctrine, federal courts should abstain from intervening in
incomplete state civil proceedings. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
50. In its answers to the certified questions, the Hawaii Supreme Court stated that
state ownership was not a corporeal ownership, but was akin to a public trust:
This is not ownership in the corporeal sense where the State
may do with the property as it pleases; rather, we comprehend
the nature of the State's ownership as retention of such au-
thority to assure the continued existence and beneficial appli-
cation of the resource for the common good.
The nature of this ownership is thus akin to the title held
by all states in navigable waterways which was recognized by
the United States Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railroad
v. Illinois [citations omitted]:
It is a title held in trust for the people of the State that
they may enjoy the navigation of the water. . ..
65 Hawaii at 674, 658 P.2d at 310.
51. There are two reasons why Robinson v. Ariyoshi did not present an actual case
or controversy. First, the judgment was not complete. See supra note 48. Second, the
declaration of a public trust, without any concrete action by state officials, presents no
claim to judge. The Amended Judgment on Remand issued by the lower court in Robin-
son after the decision of the Ninth Circuit gives further indication that the case was not
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a state statute, state officials issued limited duration permits
that substantially diminished the economic value of water to a
particular user.52 An injunction prior to that stage is analogous
to an injunction against zoning that may eventually go too far.
In addition, the Ninth Circuit took the position that ripe-
ness exists where there is a "cloud" over property rights.53 The
rules announced in many appellate decisions create a "clouds" of
some sort over the rights of the immediate parties as well as per-
sons with an economic stake in the legal issues involved.54 For
the Ninth Circuit to assert that there is a ripe controversy justi-
fying an original action in federal court simply because there is a
"cloud" over the rights of one of the parties is to interpret the
doctrine of ripeness in a way that renders it meaningless. 5
The case might be ripe if the corpus of the waters were
transferred by the McBryde decision itself. If this is true then
the suit should be dismissed as barred by the eleventh amend-
ment.56 No one denies that the state could exercise its eminent
ripe:
McBryde constitutes a cloud on the surface water rights of the
private property owners, but because the defendant State Offi-
cials in these proceedings have taken no steps to interfere
with, and have denied that they are presently planning to take
steps to interfere with the property of the Plaintiffs, McBryde
Sugar Company, Limited, Olokele Sugar Company, Limited,
and the Small Owners, as declared above, an injunction
against the defendant State Officials may be premature at this
time. Thus, no injunctive relief will be granted at this time
since the declaration of the rights of the parties herein would
appear sufficient to protect the rights of the private parties.
Amended Judgment on Remand at 4-5, Robinson v. Ariyoshi (Civ. No. 74-32) (D. Ha-
waii, Sept. 24, 1985).
52. If the water rights of the parties could be considered settled and such rights
were replaced with short term permits that substantially reduced the amount of water
allowed, then a taking claim is conceivable. Even then, the parties are not likely to suc-
ceed in invalidating a state statute that is applied in a rational manner. See generally,
Kloos, Aipa and Chang, Water Rights, Water Regulation and the "Taking Issue" in
Hawai'i, Technical Report No. 120, Water Resources Research Center, University of Ha-
waii (May 1983). See also, Cherry v. Steiner, 716 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 931 (1984) (upholding the Arizona Groundwater Management Act of. 1980).
53. 753 F.2d at 1471.
54. It is obvious that new decisions can have economic implications for non-parties.
55. To satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of article III of the Constitu-
tion, a plaintiff must show real and immediate possibility of direct injury, not conjectural
or hypothetical harm. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-05 (1983).
56. The eleventh amendment states: "The judicial power of the United States shall
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domain powers and acquire the water or water rights of the
sugar companies. In that case, the state would be required to
pay just compensation. If the case is ripe in the sense that the
waters have already been transferred to the state by the Mc-
Bryde decision itself, then the suit would be against the state for
payment of just compensation. When a suit against named state
officials seeks the award of monetary relief for retroactive con-
duct, it must be barred by the eleventh amendment. 7 This re-
sult may seem odd in that it appears to eliminate any possible
cause of action against a state that commits a taking. 8 Prior to
the alleged taking, the case is not ripe. Immediately after the
taking, the claim for money damage is precluded because of the
eleventh amendment. The eleventh amendment, however, only
acts to bar the suit in federal district court. In the normal case,
one could sue in state court to compel payment of just
compensation.
The basic flaw lies in the visualization of the McBryde deci-
sion as a taking, much as if it were a state bulldozer that de-
stroyed plaintiffs' property. The error is in viewing an appellate
decision as "taking" property. 9 As discussed here, decisions do
not take property.60 Rather, they declare the rights of the par-
ties. In other words, McBryde, even if viewed as a decision de-
termining the ownership of the surface waters, must be seen as
declaring that the state has always been the owner of the
waters.6 1
The suit in Robinson v. Ariyoshi could be interpreted as
simply seeking a declaration of a taking without seeking pay-
ment of compensation. If successful, the parties would have to
seek valuation of their claims in state court. This would put the
state judge in a difficult position since the state court would be
bound by the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision that McBryde
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
57. Quern v. Jordon, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
58. One possible means of avoiding this result is for the parties to bring an action in
ejectment against the state. Cf. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
59. See generally, Chang, Unravelling Robinson, supra note 8.
60. Id. at 57.
61. If the state has always been the owner of the water then the McBryde decision
itself could not constitute a taking.
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was simply a reaffirmation of the public trust doctrine. At the
same time, the state judge would have to consider the argument
that he should apply full faith and credit to the federal district
court's judgment declaring a taking.62
In short, the action in Robinson v. Ariyoshi did not present
an actual case or controversy since it was a disguised appeal of
the McBryde decision.63 It is not ripe in the same manner that
any declaration of law, without more, does not create a case or
controversy." One cannot enjoin a court's declaration of law,
just as one cannot enjoin the effects of dicta.6 5 The lack of ripe-
ness is only one aspect of the inherent falsity of the cause of
action in Robinson.
B. THE ROOKER DOCTRINE AND RES JUDICATA
Assuming that the Ninth Circuit was correct about ripeness,
it still had to deal with two doctrines which declare that the fed-
eral courts should not entertain state claims that were, or should
have been, raised and decided in a prior state proceeding. Two
almost identical doctrines, the Rooker principle,66 that federal
courts should not act as appellate courts of the states, and the
claim preclusion aspect of res judicata command this result.6 7
The chief difference between these two is that Rooker is a juris-
dictional bar and res judicata is a defense.6 8 Thus, a federal
judge could raise the Rooker bar to jurisdiction on the court's
own motion, at any time in the proceedings.69 On the other
hand, res judicata is waived unless raised by a party.7 0
62. Arguably, the declaratory judgment in federal court would be res judicata as to
the issue of a taking in the subsequent state court action to determine valuation. Cf.
Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938).
63. A subsequent action is a disguised appeal of an earlier action if the law of the
jurisdiction rendering the first judgment would deem the second action barred by its law
of claim preclusion. For an explanation see Chang, Rooker Doctrine, supra note 33, at
1357-63.
64. Acts of appellate courts in declaring the law do not create an original cause of
action. Id. at 1346-49.
65. Dicta, by its very nature, has no legal effect on the immediate parties, or others,
to the decision.
66. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
67. See Chang, Rooker Doctrine, supra note 33, at 1350-56.
68. Id. at 1355.
69. Id.
70. Id. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 n. 19 (1976).
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In response to the argument that the Rooker or claim pre-
clusion doctrine barred the action in Robinson, the sugar compa-
nies would assert two objections. First, they would argue that it
is not true that the claim was considered in the prior state pro-
ceeding.71 Second, even if the claim had been implicitly consid-
ered, the failure to allow the sugar companies to fully brief the
claim or present factual evidence as to the implications of the
new McBryde decision constituted a denial of due process. 72 Ar-
guably, both grounds justify the refusal of the federal district
court to apply res judicata.7 3 Similarly, it can be asserted that
both grounds serve as an exception to the Rooker doctrine that
lower federal courts should not act as appellate courts of the
state.74
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the sugar companies and
held that where the state court never entertained a claim, a
lower federal court is not barred from considering that claim. 75
Of course, this reasoning misses the most obvious objection of"
all. As noted earlier, the constitutionality or correctness of a de-
cision is not a new and separate claim different from the under-
lying claim. Even if one persists in the belief that it is a new and
separate claim, then, it is still true that a court rendering a deci-
sion considers and resolves affirmatively the constitutional valid-
ity of its own decision by the very act of rendering the decision.
Every decision represents an implicit decision of constitu-
tional validity.76 It would be superfluous for every court to add
71. 753 F.2d at 1472.
72. 441 F. Supp. at 564.
73. 753 F.2d at 1472.
74. The Ninth Circuit, holding that the failure to entertain a claim was an exception
to the subject matter principle of Rooker, stated that "if Rooker were a blanket jurisdic-
tional bar precluding the litigation of claims even if there had been no actual state court
opportunity to litigate them, Rooker would swallow the 'full and fair opportunity to liti-
gate' limitation to res judicata clearly established elsewhere by the Supreme Court." 753
F.2d at 1472.
75. The Ninth Circuit also held that "[wihere a state court has refused to entertain
federal constitutional claims, a federal court violates the precepts of neither subject mat-
ter jurisdiction nor res judicata by hearing those claims." Id. at 1473.
76. Cf. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876) ("[T]hat a judgment
estops not only as to every ground of recovery or defense actually presented in the ac-
tion, but also as to every ground which might have been presented, is strictly accurate.").
See also Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470, 477 (1929); Grossgold v. Supreme
Court of Ill., 557 F.2d 122, 124-25 (7th Cir. 1977); Tang v. New York Supreme Court, 487
F.2d 138, 141 n.2 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974).
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at the end of its opinion: "Moreover, we decide that the decision
reached above is constitutional." Obviously, no court considers
the constitutionality of its own decision and then rules in the
negative. Hence, every state and federal decision implicitly af-
firms the court's view that its acts are constitutional. It is logical
to presume that all courts believe they are issuing decisions
which are constitutional and do not intentionally issue decisions
that they secretly believe are unconstitutional. Courts may be
wrong as to the constitutionality of a decision, but it cannot logi-
cally be argued that the issue was not decided. Hence, in the
case of state supreme court decisions, the United States Su-
preme Court may ultimately decide that the state court was
wrong as to the constitutionality of the decision, but there is no
question that the issue is always implicitly considered and im-
plicitly decided. Recent Supreme Court decisions have held that
a claim that should have been raised in the state proceeding
cannot be relitigated in a federal proceeding." A fortiori, claims
that were raised and decided even implicitly, are also barred.7 8
This result is commanded by the full faith and credit clause.7 9 If
the state law would have barred relitigation, the federal court
must provide the same result.80 This is true even if the federal
court believes that the state court erred in its application of
state law.'
The second objection that the sugar companies would make
to the application of Rooker or res judicata is that this new
claim regarding the constitutionality of McBryde was not fully
77. See, e.g., Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 106 S.Ct. 768 (1986) (even if
the state court mistakenly rejected respondent's res judicata claim, this does not justify a
federal court injunction against enforcement of state court judgment); Marrese v. Ameri-
can Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 84 L.Ed.2d 274, 105 S.Ct. 1327 (1985) (lower fed-
eral courts must apply res judicata law of the state in which judgment was entered);
Migra v. Warren City School Dist., 465 U.S. 75 (1984) (with respect to claims that could
have been raised in the prior state proceeding but were not, the federal court must apply
claim preclusion to bar such a claim if the state law of the state which rendered the
judgment would also apply claim preclusion); Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.,
456 U.S. 461 (1982) (federal court must apply the res judicata law of the state that ren-
dered the allegedly preclusive judgment); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (same).
78. Cf. Migra v. Warren City School Dist., 465 U.S. 75 (1984) (applying the law of
the state rendering the judgment to bar claims reserved and not raised in the prior state
proceeding).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
80. See cases cited supra note 77.
81. Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 54 U.S.L.W. 4144 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1986)
(No. 84-1616).
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and fairly litigated in the previous action.82 In other words, res
judicata should not apply because the state supreme court vio-
lated procedural due process by failing to allow the sugar com-
panies the right to address the constitutionality of McBryde in
overruling earlier precedents.
The Ninth Circuit was wrong on two counts. The system did
afford the sugar companies two opportunities to raise their con-
stitutional objections and the United States Supreme Court has
required much less in terms of procedural due process in its own
proceedings. First, the sugar companies had an opportunity to
notify the Hawaii Supreme Court of their constitutional objec-
tions when they petitioned the Hawaii Supreme Court for a re-
hearing. 83 Second, when the sugar companies sought review in
the Supreme Court they asserted their constitutional concerns in
their petition for certiorari. 4 It is true that the Hawaii Supreme
82. 441 F. Supp. at 580.
83. McBryde Sugar Company stated in its answering brief before the Ninth Circuit:
Timely petitions for rehearing and motions for an opportunity
to present evidence and argument on the constitutional claims
were filed by McBryde, G & R, Olokele and the Small Own-
ers .... On June 18, 1973, the Supreme Court ordered the
parties to file briefs limited to two questions framed by the
Court which in no manner related to the constitutional issues,
or provided opportunity for a hearing on McBryde's federal
claims (citations omitted).
Answering Brief of McBryde Sugar Co., Defendant-Appellee at 9, Robinson v. Ariyoshi,
753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985).
84. McBryde Sugar Company and Olokele Sugar Company joined in an appeal, or
petition for certiori, from the Hawaii Supreme Court's McBryde decision and made the
following constitutional claim in their appeal:
The property rights of both Olokele and McBryde have now
been taken. The Hawaii Supreme Court's construction of Stat.
L. Kamehameha III 81 (1847) has conferred ownership of all
water on the State of Hawaii, the term "ownership" not being
used by the Court in the publici juris sense, since prescription
of the right to use water is precluded. Moreover, the Court's
construction of Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 7-1 has taken some portion
of Gay & Robinson's normal flow surplus water for use of
other riparians. Under the decisions of this Court, a taking
without compensation has occurred. [Citations omitted.]
Olokele also submits that the Hawaii Supreme Court has vio-
lated the Due Process Clause, by failing, in the absence of cir-
cumstances relevant under the Due Process Clause (such as
the existence of a judgment rendered without jurisdiction or
procured by fraud), to accord res judicata effect to the deci-
sion of Territory v. Gay ....
Appellants' Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 35, McBryde Sugar Co. v. Hawaii, cert.
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Court denied them a right to argue the constitutional issues on
rehearing and that the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari,
depriving them of the opportunity to brief fully both courts at
length on these issues. This does not, however, prove a denial of
procedural due process. Rather, it simply shows that both courts
did not consider these claims worthy of reconsideration or cer-
tiorari. No court is required by the constitution to provide full
briefing and oral argument on every issue that a party contends
is at stake. In summary affirmance proceedings, the Supreme
Court of the United States has ruled at times without oral argu-
ment or briefs from the losing side."5
denied and appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 962 (1974).
Moreover, a number of small farmers joined in the petition for certiorari on the side
of the sugar companies. Their constitutional claim was that the McBryde decision's rule
against transfer of water deprived them of economic rights since they were engaged in
the sale of their water rights. There is no basis for these parties to participate in the
present action. Since these parties agree that the issue of transfer and severance of the
appurtenant water rights of the parties were never raised, then, any judicial statements
on the issue in McBryde must have been dicta. As dicta, the statement could not have
deprived them of their property. In their brief to the Supreme Court, the small farmers
state that the issue of transfer was never raised:
The State of Hawaii never challenged Petitioners' rights to
sever the ownership of their water rights from the land with
which they originally passed as an appurtenance, or to transfer
those waters for use on other lands, whether or not within the
watershed of origin. . . . The sole issues before the trial court
affecting Petitioners were the determination of what lands had
appurtenant water rights by virtue of ancient Hawaiian taro
culture thereon and the amount of water to which each such
acre was entitled.
Petitioners' Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5-6, Albarado v. Hawaii, cert. denied, 417
U.S. 962 (1974).
The small owners also challenged the constitutionality of the McBryde decision in
their petition. Id. at 11. The small owners also raised these same claims in their petition
for rehearing before the Hawaii Supreme Court. Id. at 11 n.16. In any event, the Hawaii
Supreme Court, in a separate case, has ruled that appurtenant water rights cannot be
severed and transferred. Such rights can only be extinguished by deed. Reppun v. Board
of Water Supply, 65 Hawaii 531, 656 P.2d 57 (1982) cert. denied sub nom. Board of
Water Supply v. Nakata, 105 S. Ct. 2016 (1985).
85. As Stern and Gressman in their treatise on Supreme Court practice point out,
the Supreme Court has summarily affirmed and reversed cases arising from the lower
courts without briefings on the merits by either side:
In such cases it is unlikely that the appellee will have filed a
motion to affirm on the ground that no substantial question
has been presented . . . . But unless . . . counsel is familiar
with the Court's practice in this respect, he will not be fore-
warned that the case may be lost on the appeal papers without
his having filed anything at all.
STERN AND GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, 379 (1979). This is a practice which the
Supreme Court views as comporting with the requirements of procedural due process.
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Furthermore, the sugar companies argued they were denied
procedural due process because they were not allowed to present
factual evidence as to how the McBryde decision would affect
the operation of the sugar industry as a whole. When landmark
decisions are issued by a court sua sponte, parties or interested
amicus curiae are often denied the opportunity to present to the
court facts as to how the new rule would affect any particular
segment of society. In one of the most celebrated sua sponte de-
cisions of all, Erie v. Tompkins, 6 the Supreme Court implicitly
rejected any notion that due process guaranteed the parties a
right to present evidence as to how Erie would affect the evolu-
tion of state law.
None 6f the arguments presented here conflict with the as-
sertion that new and separate claims, different from the under-
lying claim, can arise during the judicial process. For example,
suppose during an appellate argument an annoyed justice of a
state supreme court leaned over and banged an advocate over
the head with a gavel. Or, suppose a state supreme court had a
rule which allowed defendants' brief to be one hundred pages
and plaintiffs' brief to be four.87 Or, suppose in attaching prop-
erty, sheriffs enforcing a judicial decree maliciously shot a pro-
testing defendant. In each of these cases, the resolution of the
underlying case in a final judgment would not necessarily termi-
nate the separate action brought in tort, equal protection, or as a
civil rights action. But these instances of "state action" or "judi-
cial misconduct" are different from the alleged judicial wrong in
McBryde. One might term the above "process" acts. On the
other hand, McBryde involved a court acting in its "appellate"
capacity.8
United States v. Haley, 358 U.S. 644 (1958); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942);
Chamberlin v. Dade County Board, 377 U.S. 402 (1963); and School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1962). Moreover, the Supreme Court has summarily
reversed cases without briefing from the losing side. Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S.
478 (1974); Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61
(1975) and Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975). The constitution clearly does not require
oral argument on every issue or on every appeal. STERN AND GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE, 317 (1978).
86. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
87. Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (violation of due process and equal pro-
tection clauses for state judicial system to condition appeal on the ability of an individ-
ual to purchase a transcript).
88. The author, in a different context, has defined "appellate acts," as opposed to
"original acts" as follows:
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The lower federal court in Robinson v. Ariyoshi broadly as-
serted that judicial action could be the basis for state action.
McBryde does not involve the enforcement of a judgment. Ap-
pellate acts, in the form of judicial decisions by properly consti-
tuted state supreme courts, are not "state action." If appellate
decisionmaking, without more, constituted state action, many fi-
nal decisions could be collaterally attacked in federal trial
courts. Such a theory would undermine the finality of the judi-
cial process. There would be two routes to appeal cases. State
supreme court decisions could be appealed either to the U.S. Su-
preme Court or to federal district court as was done in
Robinson89
In conclusion, both Rooker and res judicata apply to bar the
subsequent federal action in Robinson v. Ariyoshi. It is errone-
ous thinking and bad theory to contend that the correctness of a
judicial decision constitutes a new and separate claim from the
underlying action. Even so, the normal rules of res judicata ap-
ply to bar this "new" claim from being raised in federal court.
Once the McBryde judgment had been reviewed by the United
States Supreme Court, the system as a whole had spoken. The
judicial process would be substantially weakened if another part
of the system could revive a dispute which had been finally
adjudicated.
C. UNFORCED ERRORS: Six ANSWERS IN SEARCH OF AN AUDIENCE
Probably the most disturbing aspect of Robinson v.
Ariyoshi was the Ninth Circuit's decision to ignore the answers
The term "original acts" means acts, such as automobile acci-
dents, breaches of contract, employment termination, and the
like, that give rise to legal claims. In contrast, appellate acts
are events that occur within the legal system: the decision of
any court, even one of first resort, is thus an "appellate act."
Within the concept of appellate acts there exists a distinction
between declaration acts (acts of declaring law) and process
acts (the procedural manner in which the system treats a liti-
gant). Since the procedural manner in which the system treats
a litigant could constitute a separate claim; claims based on
procedural abuses should not be dismissed under Rooker. Fed-
eral court challenges to the substantive determinations of
state court decisions (declaration acts), however, are imper-
missible under Rooker [citations omitted].
Chang, Rooker Doctrine, supra note 33, at 1346-47.
89. Id. at 1345-46.
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it requested from the Hawaii Supreme Court concerning the
meaning of McBryde.90 This is unfortunate since the answers
given by the Hawaii Supreme Court rendered moot the conflict
between the two sides. The answers to the certified questions
eliminated the harm upon which plaintiffs had based their case.
Thus, the decision to ignore these answers is curious. It would
appear that the Ninth Circuit was seeking predetermined an-
swers and was willing to disregard nonconforming answers. If
this is so it would be an improper use of the certification proce-
dure. It would also seem to violate the well-established rule that
a state supreme court has a sovereign right to determine ques-
tions of state law and that such determinations should be bind-
ing on federal courts.9 1
In its answers to the six questions, the Hawaii Supreme
Court made two statements which in effect mooted the case.
First, the court withdrew its earlier ruling absolutely prohibiting
water from being transported outside of the watershed.92 Sec-
ond, it held that its ruling on "state ownership" of water was not
meant to transfer the water in a corporeal way to the state. In-
stead, the court explained that it had asserted that the state had
a public trust over the waters.9 8
90. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Hawaii 642, 658 P.2d 287 (1982).
91. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
92. The Hawaii Supreme Court in its answers to the certified questions clarified its
earlier statements:
Thus we take issue with the federal district court's characteri-
zation of McBryde as "restraining the free diversion of surface
waters for use outside the lands of the plaintiffs to which they
are appurtenant." [Citation omitted]. McBryde merely estab-
lished that there was no right on the part of the plaintiffs to
benefit from such diversions. But, as was the case in our pre-
existing law, governing the transport of water, diversions will
be restrained only after a careful assessment of the interests
and circumstances involved indicates a need for restraint. A
delineation of these interests and circumstances were not
before us in McBryde and we did not order the cessation of
any diversions. Consistently with our statutory prerogative, we
merely defined the appropriate scope of the rights established
in the case and left the actual enforcement of these limitation
to appropriate subsequent actions brought by the parties in-
cluding the State.
65 Hawaii at 649-50, 658 P.2d at 295 (footnote omitted, emphasis in original).
93. See supra note 50. The United States Supreme Court reviews judgments not
opinions. See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984).
Thus, considered in light of the Answers to Certified Questions, the judgment in Mc-
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These two interpretations of the McBryde rulings com-
pletely gut the plaintiffs' taking claim. First, the court stated
that the original decision only meant there was no absolute right
to transfer water. Such transfers must be reasonable in light of
the possibility of harm to other water users.9' These statements
are within the mainstream of riparian rights. Moreover, they are
particularly reasonable in an island state with a scarcity of water
resources.
Secondly, the certified answers stated that the term "state
ownership," as used in the original McBryde decision, meant
that the state had a "public trust" over the waters. With this
reinterpretation of the McBryde decision, it could not be argued
that decision itself transferred the corpus of the waters. The no-
tion of a state public trust over the waters is akin to that of the
police power to regulate. 5 Thus, the declaration of "state owner-
ship" in McBryde could not constitute the state action that took
plaintiffs' property. Since, the McBryde decision cannot be said
to "take" property, and since the state could not enforce Mc-
Bryde, the substantive due process claim of the plaintiffs must
fail in its entirety.
In the alternative, the sugar companies might assert that
the declaration of a public trust may be the basis for a future
taking. This may be so if a limited duration permit system were
adopted in Hawaii and the amount of water allowed the sugar
companies were substantially reduced. But the constitutionality
of a permit system as implemented is a completely different
question from the constitutionality of McBryde. It would only
become ripe as a question of law when and if such a permit sys-
tem were adopted and implemented.
It was never necessary for the state to "own" the water to
accomplish its goals of management and regulation. It may have
been thought that ownership of the body of water would allow
the state to sell the sugar companies the water they were using
prior to McBryde. However, no official of the State Department
of Land and Natural Resources, charged with administration
and regulation of water, has taken the position that the state
Bryde v. Robinson certainly did not take petitioners' property.
94. See supra note 92.
95. See supra note 50.
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should sell water to the sugar companies as a means of raising
revenues. This is simply not a realistic political position. Sugar
is one of the three major industries in Hawaii, with approxi-
mately 8,500 employees." The sugar industry is completely de-
pendent on federal price supports to stay in business. 7 Raising
production costs by charging for the use of water would only
hasten the demise of the sugar industry and lead to catastrophic
consequences for the state.
The clarification in the certified answers may have been a
recognition that it was never in the state's interest to "own the
water" in a corporeal sense. Like every other state, the state
needs the power to regulate and manage water. Under the police
powers inherent in its sovereignty, the state already possessed
much of the necessary power. Indeed, the state already had a
groundwater management statute.98 A new statute granting simi-
lar powers to manage surface water could have been enacted
with or without declaration of a public trust over such waters by
the Hawaii Supreme Court." The clarification in the certified
answers that "state ownership" meant "public trust" merely re-
96. Total number of jobs in the sugar industry has declined from 14,635 in 1960 to
9,000 in 1979 and less in 1986. See Plasch, Hawaii's Sugar Industry: Problems, Outlook
and Urban Growth Issues at 70, Dep't of Planning and Economic Development, State
of Hawaii, April 1981.
97. Under previous sugar legislation, quotas, import levies and taxes were used to
maintain domestic sugar prices at levels profitable to domestic producers. Id. at 130.
Sugar price supports were recently included in the Food Security Act of 1985, 99 Stat.
1354.
98. Hawaii's Ground-Water Use Act allows the Department of Land and Natural
Resources to designate areas and manage the withdrawal of groundwater from these ar-
eas through a permit system. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 177-1-177-35 (1976).
99. In addition to the powers of the state to legislate in this area under its inherent
police powers, the state has a mandate to enact a water code to provide comprehensive
water management by virtue of a 1978 amendment to the state constitution that
provides:
Section 7. The State has an obligation to protect, control and
regulate the use of Hawaii's water resources for the benefit of
its people.
The legislature shall provide for a water resources agency
which, as provided by law, shall set overall water conservation,
quality and use policies; define beneficial and reasonable uses;
protect ground and surface water resources, watersheds and
natural stream environments; establish criteria for water use
priorities while assuring appurtenant rights and existing cor-
relative and riparian uses and establish procedures for regulat-
ing all uses of Hawaii's water resources.
HAWAII CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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affirmed the state's power to regulate water and did not consti-
tute a transfer of the corpus of the water.
At this point the litigation should have ended. The Ninth
Circuit should have reversed the lower court and dissolved the
injunction. Instead the Ninth Circuit ignored the certified an-
swers,100 and proceeded to find a federal constitutional violation.
This is unfortunate since the McBryde decision, viewed in its
least attractive light, simply did not decide the issues before the
court. The Hawaii Supreme Court was asked to decide whether
the trial court's allocation of waters among the parties was cor-
rect. The net effect of the original McBryde decision and the
certified answers is that the state supreme court simply asserted
that the state has a public trust over the waters and that there is
never an absolute right to divert. Both statements are, in es-
sence, dicta and constitute a non-responsive answer to the ques-
tions presented. While such a result is a frustration of the judi-
cial process, particularly for litigants in a case which commenced
in 1959, the actions of the court do not constitute a taking.
The result in Robinson v. Ariyoshi is ironic. The Hawaii Su-
preme Court indicated that McBryde should be remanded to the
trial court without clear instructions as to how to reallocate the
waters. Despite the lengthy federal proceedings and dramatic as-
sertions of constitutional violations, this is also the net result of
the Ninth Circuit decision. Subsequent to affirmance in the
Ninth Circuit, the federal district court in Robinson v. Ariyoshi
remanded the case to the state trial court to determine prescrip-
tive rights and allocate storm and freshet waters. 101 However, as
100. The only mention that the Ninth Circuit makes of the certified questions is the
following:
The leisurely pace of this litigation has produced three oral
arguments in this court, two of which were followed by referral
of certified questions to the Supreme Court of Hawaii. [Cita-
tion omitted.] Following the publication of the state court's
answers to the certified questions, the parties briefed the re-
maining issues that had been narrowed by the earlier proceed-
ings and reargued the case.
753 F.2d at 1471.
101. The federal district court retained jurisdiction over the case and remanded to
the state trial court for a determination of prescriptive rights and an allocation of the
storm and freshet waters:
Unless determined by agreement of the parties in interest, the
ultimate determination, to be made in the light of the deci-
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was the case subsequent to McBryde, the state trial court has no
new legal basis upon which to allocate the waters. It was the
same trial court's initial decision that was appealed to the Ha-
waii Supreme Court, in the form of the McBryde decision, which
was again subsequently "appealed" to the federal district court,
the Robinson decision. The federal court has now remanded the
case to the state trial court. This act seems inappropriate given
the normal rules regarding the relationship between state and
federal courts. In effect, the state trial court has become the ap-
pellate court for its own decision. The federal court did not de-
clare any "state" substantive law by which the state court was to
re-decide the case. Such an act would have been clearly beyond
the powers of the federal court. Nor do the certified answers
from the Hawaii Supreme Court, which are binding on the lower
state courts, provide any rules upon which to allocate the water.
Those certified answers that established the proper meaning of
McBryde simply declared that the state has a public trust over
the waters.
There are three actions that create this ironic circumstance.
The first is federal intervention in ongoing state proceedings
that have not yet been completed. 10 2 This prevents the state ju-
dicial process from having the opportunity to resolve the mean-
ing of McBryde in terms of specific allocation of the water. The
second action is the Ninth Circuit's decision to ignore the an-
swers to the certified questions. 103 Even assuming that courts
sions rendered by this Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, of the prescriptive water rights of McBryde Sugar
Company, Limited, and of the allocation of storm and freshet
surplus waters, is left to the Hawaii Fifth Circuit Court sitting
as statutory water commissioner ....
Amended Judgment After Remand at 7 and 8, Robinson v. Ariyoshi (Civ. No. 74-32) (D.
Hawaii, Sept. 24, 1985).
102. The federal court should abstain from such intervention. Trainor v. Hernandez,
431 U.S. 434 (1977).
103. Treating the answers from certified questions as non-binding will undermine
the use of this technique. State supreme courts will have no interest in issuing opinions
that will be ignored or construed against the wishes of the court. The decision of the
Ninth Circuit to ignore the certified questions seems questionable in light of the princi-
ples of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and against the spirit of the Full
Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (1976). Within the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme
Court of Washington deems its answers to certified questions as binding and non-
advisory:
The case at bar illustrates clearly the needed and binding
character of the decision of this court to the question certified.
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can "take," the answers eliminated any possibility of a taking.
The Ninth Circuit should have deemed the answers binding and
reversed the judgment. The third action is the failure of the Ha-
waii Supreme Court to determine specifically how to allocate the
water. The Hawaii Supreme Court, however, cannot be blamed
in this matter since the federal courts intervened before the ac-
tion could be remanded to the state trial court. Moreover, the
certified questions to the Hawaii Supreme Court from the Ninth
Circuit did not specifically address this issue. Thus, the parties
were caught between a federal court that should not have acted
and a state court that did not act.
In a very real sense Robinson is much ado about nothing.
The McBryde decision did not change the status quo. Nonethe-
less, despite the fact that the sugar companies never could have
been harmed, the sugar companies may be awarded approxi-
mately four million dollars in attorney fees as the "prevailing"
parties. It is difficult to understand how they "prevailed," since
the perceived threat arose out of the wrong interpretation of the
Hawaii Supreme Court's language as to "state ownership" of
water. In a sense, the action in Robinson v. Ariyoshi was brought
on the basis of the opposing parties stipulating to the wrong
meaning of a judicial decision. The state should not be penalized
by the award of attorneys fees to the plaintiffs simply because
the plaintiffs successfully persuaded the district court to adopt
an improper interpretation of McBryde. The rule of "no harm,
no foul" should apply. Even assuming the waters could be
owned, the threat of a taking of waters from the plaintiffs was
never a conceptual, legal or political reality.
D. No PROPERTY INTEREST IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS
As stated, to reach the result in Robinson, it was necessary
for the Ninth Circuit to construct false premises. First, as de-
scribed above, it was necessary for the court to assert that the
The whole reason for invoking the certified question procedure
is to obtain an authoritative meaning of RCW 48.410 so that
the district court can apply that meaning in disposing of the
bankruptcy proceeding pending before it.
In re Elliot, 74 Wash.2d 600, 446 P.2d 347, 355 (1968). See also In re Richards, 223 A.2d
827, 832 (Me. 1966) (Supreme Court of Maine considers certified answers binding on the
federal courts).
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constitutionality of a judicial decision constitutes a separate
cause of action from the underlying claim. Moreover, the court
misinterpreted United States Supreme Court precedent as hold-
ing that the appellate decisions of a state supreme court can
constitute "state action" for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit assumed that judicial precedents
can create property rights. This is a necessary step in any allega-
tion that an overruling decision has taken property. One must
assume that the property taken was created by an earlier judi-
cial decision.
There are three senses in which a judicial decision can as-
sertedly create property rights in various parties. First, there is
the assertion that parties who did not participate in a judicial
decision relied on the rules of law laid down by that judicial de-
cision. Arguably, if there is sufficient evidence of reliance, these
parties may claim a property interest created by the rules. These
assertions has been rejected. The United States Supreme Court
has held that decisions do not create a property interest.
1 04
The second sense is that of res judicata. Parties to final
judgments have strong rights not to have their judgments dis-
turbed, despite the fact that the original law under which the
case was decided may have changed.10
Finally, there is a third sense, as implied by the Ninth Cir-
cuit, that parties to a proceeding have a property interest in the
general rules of law laid down by that decision. The difference
between the second and third senses is that in the third sense
104. Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924); Dunbar v. City of New York,
251 U.S. 516 (1920); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). Thus, as to McBryde
Sugar Company, which was not related to a party in the Gay proceeding, it should not be
able to claim a vested property right arising out of Gay or other cases. The Ninth Circuit
held otherwise:
The Robinson I court found that McBryde Sugar Company
also relied upon the law set forth in Territory II and devel-
oped water rights that became vested. (Territorial cases are
collected in Territory I, 31 Hawaii at 384). The extent of Mc-
Bryde's rights, however, the district court left for further liti-
gation in the state courts. [Citation omitted.]
753 F.2d at 1474.
105. Federated Dep't Store, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
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the parties to a proceeding assertedly have a right to rely on the
reasoning, as opposed to judgment, of a decision. In other words,
the reasoning of a decision creates a vested right upon which the
immediate parties may rely.106
In Robinson, the Ninth Circuit held that by an earlier deci-
sion in Territory v. Gay, 7 the Supreme Court of the Territory
of Hawaii determined that the owner of land upon which water
arose essentially owned the surface water subject to minor rights
of others for domestic use. That Territorial Supreme Court deci-
sion was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. From this language, the
106. Parties to a judgment may have a constitutional interest in the protection of
the judgment in a res judicata sense. It is the judgment that creates the right. The Ninth
Circuit's discussion indicates that it is the rules which create a vested property right for
the immediate parties to the decision. Thus, the court does not give a legal ground by
which to distinguish the vested rights of non-parties to a decision, such as McBryde
Sugar Company, from parties, Gay and Robinson. Non-parties have no vested rights in
decisions. See supra note 104. Parties do not have a vested right as to a decision, but
may claim that their judgment is protected by the bar and merger principles of res judi-
cats. The Ninth Circuit's discussion should have been limited to whether Gay was res
judicata as to the McBryde decision. Apparently, the parties did not think so since the
parties to Gay participated willingly in the McBryde litigation and did not raise the res
judicata issue. Hence, Gay and McBryde must be deemed as having presented two differ-
ent causes of action: Gay as to the right to divert and McBryde as to the allocation of
the waters. The sugar companies would claim that the right to divert as determined in
Gay was based on a rule of ownership of the waters and that this reasoning created
vested rights that could not be disturbed in McBryde. The Hawaii Supreme Court in its
answers to the certified questions however, stated that the ownership of these waters was
not adjudicated in Gay because:
Issues related to the definition or quantification of such nor-
mal daily surplus were not implicated because the parties stip-
ulated to the presence of such waters and left open the ques-
tion of the rights of others. . . . [T]here was no ruling with
respect to the rights of others upon which the very existence
of surplus water was contingent.
65 Hawaii at 670, 658 P.2d at 308.
107. 31 Hawaii 356 (1931). The Ninth Circuit interpreted the effect of the Gay deci-
sion as follows:
On April 28, 1930, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Ha-
waii, in litigation between substantially the same parties that
are here today, except for the McBryde Sugar Company, held
that the common law doctrine of riparian rights was not in
force in Hawaii with reference to surplus waters of the normal
flow of a stream. The same court further held that the owner
(konohiki) of the land (ili) could use the water collected on his
ili as he saw fit, subject to the rights of downstream owners to
drinking water and other domestic uses that the parties in all
this litigation have agreed have not been in controversy.
753 F.2d at 1473.
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Ninth Circuit asserted that the parties in Gay, substantially the
same parties as those in Robinson, had a vested right to the
rules laid down in Gay.'08 The Ninth Circuit went on to say that
the Hawaii Supreme Court could overrule Gay, but the Mc-
Bryde decision could not divest these parties of their vested
rights. McBryde could only prospectively effect water rights cre-
ated after it became final.109
The court is wrong on several counts. First, the United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the rules laid
down in decisions to not create vested rights.110 Second, the par-
ties in Gay have no more of a right to rely on the reasoning of
Gay than do unrelated parties. The parties in Gay clearly have a
right to a preservation of the judgment in Gay. A judgment,
however, must be distinguished from the rules creating the judg-
ment. Parties to a proceeding as well as non-parties have no
claim that the particular rules of any decision create vested
rights.
Moreover, it was improper for the Ninth Circuit to claim
that Gay stands for the rule that parties who owned the land on
which the surface waters arose controlled that water. The issue
of quantification or normal surplus water was not implicated be-
cause the parties stipulated to the presence of such waters. A
divided court held that the waters belonged to the konohiki.'"
As to storm and freshet surplus waters, Chief Justice Perry
would have included such waters in normal daily surplus, but he
was unable to convince a majority of the court." 2 Thus even if it
108. 753 F.2d at 1473-74.
109. The Ninth Circuit stated:
This declaration of a change in the water law of Hawaii may
be effective with respect to real property rights created in Ha-
waii after the McBryde I decision became final. New law, how-
ever, cannot divest rights that were vested before the court
announced the new law. See Hughes, 398 U.S. at 295-98, 88
S.Ct. at 441-43.
753 F.2d at 1474.
110. See cases cited supra note 104. The Supreme Court has also held that state
supreme courts may constitutionally overrule earlier decisions with either retroactive or
prospective effect. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co., 287 U.S.
358 (1932). This is further argument for the constitutionality of the result in McBryde.
111. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Hawaii at 670, 658 P.2d at 308 (1982) (Answers to
Certified Questions).
112. Id.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
were true that the reasoning of a judicial decision could create a
vested right, there was no clear rule from which to infer such
rights in Gay.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's statement that McBryde could
only have prospective effect makes no sense at all.18 Questions
of property law like questions of title operate retroactively by
their very nature. When the court in McBryde interpreted an
earlier statute as requiring the application of riparian law, the
change in law must refer back to the date of the enactment of a
statute. The ostensible purpose of statutory interpretation is to
ascertain original legislative intent."" When a court rules that
earlier interpretations of that original intent were wrong, the
new meaning is deemed to speak as of the date of the enactment
of the statute, not the date of the new overruling decision. Oth-
erwise, the statute cannot be considered as the basis for the
change in law.115
One might believe that the Ninth Circuit ruled that Mc-
Bryde must be treated as prospective since such prospectivity
might mitigate the harshness of the Hawaii Supreme Court's
ruling. Prospective application makes little sense when one at-
tempts to determine the corpus of waters and land to which
such a new prospective ruling apply. No new land or rivers are
being created in Hawaii.116 In this sense, the rules of property,
113. See supra note 109.
114. Professor Dickerson has stressed the importance of legislative intent as follows:
One of the most fundamental, and at the same time elu-
sive, concepts in the interpretation and application of statutes
is that of legislative intent.
The appeal of the concept is strong. In the division of re-
sponsibilities represented by the constitutional separation of
powers, the legislature calls the main policy turns and the
courts must respect its pronouncements. In such a relation-
ship, it would seem clear that so far as the legislature has ex-
pressed itself by statute the courts should try to determine as
accurately as possible what the legislature intended to be
done.
R. DICKERSON. THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES, 67 (1975).
115. If a statute is deemed to have a different "original" meaning as of the date of
the judicial decision which effectuated the change, then it must be the judge and not the
statute that is imparting the new meaning.
116. But see Hawaii v. Zimring, 58 Hawaii 106, 556 P.2d 725 (1977) (the state is the
owner of newly created volcanic lands). This final judgment in Zimring was collaterally
attacked in federal district court in Hawaii as a taking of property much like the action
in Robinson v. Ariyoshi. The federal district court dismissed on the grounds that it
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unlike the rules of procedure or torts, are, by logical necessity,
retroactive.
The Ninth Circuit might have meant that McBryde could
operate only prospectively as a matter of logic. If so, the taking
claim is undermined. If the decision could only operate prospec-
tively as a matter of logic then it was not possible for it to have
had effect on the sugar companies. If this is the proper gloss to
be given McBryde then the taking claim must vanish and with it
the claim for attorneys fees.
The purpose of this doctrinal pathology has been to demon-
strate the invalidity of the three assumptions made by the fed-
eral courts in Robinson: 1) that judicial decisions create vested
rights; 2) that appellate decisionmaking may constitute "state
action" that takes property; and 3) that the constitutionality of
a decision is a new cause of action different from the underlying
claim. By combining these false premises the federal courts in
Robinson were able to sidestep the Rooker doctrine, res judicata,
ripeness and sovereignty. These three false premises, however,
give rise to a bizarre, judicial world where the normal relation-
ship between finality and validity are reversed. In the world of
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, ultimate finality in the system is de-
stroyed in the quest for absolute truth, as if such a truth existed.
As a case concerning Hawaiian water rights, Robinson pro-
vides no guidance. In federalism terms, however, it must be
taken very seriously as a case allowing the federal district courts
to set aside final state judgments on the grounds that a decision
lacked jurisdiction:
In resolving this question, plaintiffs' characterization of their
complaint and its form cannot prevail over the substance of
their action." [citations omitted.] The relief sought by plain-
tiffs-a declaration that the state has no interest in the lava
extension and has taken the property without just compensa-
tion, an injunction compelling the State to convey the lava ex-
tension to the plaintiffs, or $350,000-is wholly dependent
upon the question of title, already determined adversely to the
plaintiffs. To grant such relief, this court clearly would have to
directly review the Hawaiian Supreme Court's decision, reject
its interpretation of Hawaiian property law, and essentially re-
verse its holding on title, and modify its judgment. [Citations
omitted.] This process clearly constitutes the exercise of ap-
pellate jurisdiction.
Zimring v. State of Hawaii, No. 79-0054, slip op. at 4-5, (D. Hawaii, filed June 25, 1979).
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took property. The next section addresses "The layman's view of
a taking," the process by which the courts arrive at decisions
such as Robinson, and the constitutionality of retroactive
overruling.
IV. THE LAYMAN'S VIEW OF A TAKING
The reasoning in Robinson runs so strongly against the
grain of the normal judicial impulse to treat final state judg-
ments as final, that the result must have been strongly moti-
vated by a view that it was the only just result. This sense of
justice was probably predicated on a "layman's" concept of a
taking, a concept noted elsewhere." The layman's view of a tak-
ing is an "I know it when I see it" approach. Although, the logic
of the judicial system may compel a different result, this ap-
proach discards rules in favor of an intuitive, experiential under-
standing of a taking.
The Ninth Circuit's frequent reference to Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion in Hughes v. Washington"' is evidence of its
conversion to this approach. In Hughes, Justice Stewart had
before him a problem similar to Robinson. Property that had
existed under an earlier decision of the Washington Supreme
Court was taken away by a later decision. His statement in that
case has a common sense "lay" ring to it:
[A] State cannot be permitted to defeat the con-
stitutional prohibition against taking property
without due process of law by the simple device of
asserting retroactively that the property it has
taken never existed at all. Whether the decision
117. As Professor Tribe has described it:
Most people know a taking when they see one, or at least
they think they do. Before the taking, an object or a piece of
land belonged to X, who could use it in a large number of
ways and who enjoyed legal protection in preventing others
from doing things to it without X's permission. After the tak-
ing, X's relationship to the object or the land was fundamen-
tally transformed; he could no longer use it at all, and other
people could invoke legal arguments and mechanisms to keep
him away from it exactly as he had been able to invoke such
arguments and mechanisms before the taking had occurred.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 456 (1977) (citing B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 88-167 (1977)).
118. 389 U.S. 290, 294-98 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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here worked an unpredictable change in state law
thus inevitably presents a federal question for the
determination of this Court .... 's
The problem Justice Stewart posed was this: The Constitu-
tion provides that property cannot be taken without just com-
pensation, but nowhere does the Constitution define property.
The definition of property is left to state courts which leads to
the problem in Hughes and Robinson.120 The proper application
of the fifth amendment could be manipulated by courts that ret-
roactively change the rules of property, or, in the case posed in
Hughes, assert that a particular interest was never property.
In a sense, a paradox is created. Property is defined as those
interests deemed to be property by the state courts. At the same
time, the federal courts assert that some interests are inherently
"property," regardless of the definition state courts apply. The
paradox is similar to a person who asserts that all bachelors are
men (because that is how "bachelor" is defined) but also claims
that it is also true as a matter of experience that some bachelors
are not men. In other words, logic commands one result, but our
experience dictates another. Take, for example, the following
paradox, called the "Class A Blackout":
The military commander of a certain camp
announces on a Saturday evening that during the
following week there will be a "Class A Blackout."
The date and time of the exercise are not pre-
scribed because a "Class A Blackout" is defined
as an exercise which the participants cannot know
is going to take place prior to 6:00 P.M. on the
evening in which it occurs. It is easy to see that it
follows from the announcement of this definition
119. Id. at 296-97.
120. In Roth, the Supreme Court stated that property interests are created by the
state:
Property interests, of course are not created by the Constitu-
tion. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an inde-
pendent source such as state law-rules or understandings
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitle-
ment to those benefits.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
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that the exercise cannot take place at all. It can-
not take place on Saturday because if it has not
occurred on one of the first six days of the week it
must occur on the last. And the fact that the par-
ticipants can know this violated the condition
which defines it. Similarly, because it cannot take
place on Saturday, it cannot take place on Friday,
either, because when Saturday is eliminated Fri-
day is the last available day and is, therefore, in-
validated for the same reason as Saturday. And
by similar arguments Thursday, Wednesday, etc.
back to Sunday are eliminated in turn, so that the
exercise cannot take place at all.'
The above illustration is a paradox because experience tells
us, that despite the logic, it is nonetheless possible to be sur-
prised. In fact, one may be so totally convinced that one could
experience a surprise blackout that one may assert that the logic
of the paradox is wrong. This is akin to the thrust of Justice
Stewart's assertion-regardless of the logic of a "taking," which
cannot by definition be occurring, he is sure that a taking has
occurred.
However, experience can often be misleading. The Ninth
Circuit in Robinson, and Justice Stewart in Hughes, may "expe-
rience" a taking since the result in McBryde resembles other
takings committed by the legislative or the executive branch.
However, the judiciary is different from the other two branches
of government. If courts were deemed to take, they would cease
to be courts. This is the point of the next section.
V. CHANGE AND DUE PROCESS: THE MYTH
Cases involving change in the law, as in McBryde v. Robin-
son, are a true embarrassment to the legal philosopher. In Eng-
land, it was not until the last two decades that the House of
Lords admitted that decisions could be overruled.122 In the
United States, occasional overruling has been deemed necessary
but the theoretical explanation, couched in Blackstonian terms,
121. P. HUGHES AND G. BRECHT, VICIOUS CIRCLES AND INFINITY: AN ANTHOLOGY OF
PARADOXES, 35-36 (1975).
122. R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 109-13 (3d ed. 1977).
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has always seemed oddly simplistic.1 23 The Blackstonian theory
of appellate decision preserved at all costs the view that judges
"declared" and did not "make" the law. 124 In Holmes' sarcastic
phrase, the law was a "brooding omnipresence in the sky.'
25
The judge consulted this presence and recorded what he discov-
ered. If a later judge applied a different version of the law, it was
explained on the basis that he had a clearer vision than the ear-
lier judge. What each judge saw and recorded was not the law
itself but only evidence of the law-much as tracks in a cloud
chamber are not the sub-atomic particles themselves, but only
evidence of the particles. Thus, one could never know the real
law with finality. 126 Later judges, equipped with better social
and historical vision, were able to "discover" a more accurate
version of the law. Thus, in the McBryde decision, the Hawaii
Supreme Court in 1974 purported to discover a new understand-
ing of mid-nineteenth century statutes which explained that the
king never intended to part with sovereignty over the water.
2 7
The notion of "discovering" the true law is an admitted fic-
tion.' 28 The purpose of the fiction is to allow courts to engage in
judicial legislation to create a more just or honest result. When
courts change the law, they act like legislative bodies. 2 ' Legisla-
123. See Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1960).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. As Professor Levy would state:
The judge merely finds the preexisting law; he then merely
declares what he finds. A prior judicial decision is not the law
itself but only evidence of what the law is. Thus a later judi-
cial decision which seems to change the law has not really
changed it at all but has only discovered the "true" rule which
was always the law.
Id. at 2. (emphasis in original). Thus, there is no possibility of arriving at the true law as
a matter of absolute finality.
127. 54 Hawaii at 184-87, 504 P.2d at 1337-39.
128. Professor Fuller explained this notion as follows: "The general fiction of Anglo-
American jurisprudence that courts do not 'make' law but only 'discover' or 'declare' it
has been the cause of innumerable special fictions designed to conceal the process of
legislation that goes on in the courts." L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONs 88 (1967).
129. Professor Leach points this out:
On the one hand, the Law Lords, when deciding a case, "find"
the law, and announce their finding. But on the other, when
they overrule themselves they are legislating, which is the pre-
rogative of the two houses of the Parliament subject to the
Royal assent. And this last is unconstitutional.
Leach, Revisionism in the House of Lords: The Bastion of Rigid Stare Decisis Falls, 80
HARV. L. REV. 791, 800 (1967).
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tive bodies resolve issues on the basis of "what's best" for soci-
ety. The Blackstonian fiction dictates that courts follow the
commands of the "law" or "what's true."
Thus, when courts act as a legislative body and do so in a
way that has severe economic consequences to parties relying on
earlier precedent, critics argue that the courts should be subject
to the just compensation clause. In other words when courts leg-
islate, they should be treated like the legislature.
The error in such thinking is that the judicial system rests
upon a fiction that courts declare rather than create the law. To
admit that courts create law and to allow their decisions to be
collaterally attacked as in Robinson would undermine the most
important function of the judicial system-the ability to resolve
disputes with finality.
Hence, once the Supreme Court had denied review in Mc-
Bryde v. Robinson, the decision was final, the "system had spo-
ken." 30 To allow a federal district court or a state trial court to
set aside that final judgment on the grounds that it was an "un-
expected change""' in the law, creates the possibility that every
final decision, even that of the Ninth Circuit in Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, could be collaterally attacked in a trial court. The im-
portance of finality need not be restated here. Nor is there need
to emphasize the dangers of stale challenges to final decrees."3 2
130. See supra note 47. The phrase "system had spoken" is taken from the follow-
ing Note:
The most obvious candidate to serve as the system's signal
that is has spoken with finality is, of course, the final judg-
ment. For the final judgment to be effective as the system's
signal it is necessary that the judgment speak not merely for
the court entering it but for the system as a whole ...
Presumably, no one would disagree with the proposition
that a final judgment rendered by the United States Supreme
Court is valid and is the system's last word, no matter how
"wrong" it may appear .... Moreover, for questions admitted
to be solely of state law, the same may be said for decisions of
state courts of last resort. They, too, speak for the system. (Ci-
tations omitted.]
Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87
YALE L. J. 164, 189-90 (1977).
131. Justice Stewart used the phrase "unpredicted change" in Hughes v. Washing-
ton, 389 U.S. at 297 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
132. The time limitations on review to the U.S. Supreme Court are designed to
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Even if final decisions may, in some sense, be "wrong" the need
for finality is so commanding in any dispute resolution system
that collateral attacks must be discouraged.
The justification for delaying finality, as in Robinson, rests
with the hope that further proceedings will produce "the
truth.' ' 133 When interests like liberty are at stake, the American
judicial system does suspend finality to a great degree in the va-
rious form of post-conviction relief.134 But, in both the cases of
criminal proceedings and determinations of the water law of a
particular state, suspensions of finality for some more accurate
determination of truth depend on the dubious assumption that
the ultimate truth is knowable. 135 In the case of criminal law, the
"ultimate truth" may appear if a key prosecution witness re-
cants years after a wrongful conviction. The "ultimate truth" is
much less clear when a federal district court second guesses a
state supreme court on the issue of that state's water law.
One may argue that preservation of the fiction that judges
declare the law hardly seems the basis to justify depriving par-
ties of vested rights. But, the real fiction is that of our concept
of law itself-that it is an unchanging body of rules capable of
clear interpretation. Our willingness to be bound by the rule of
law rests upon the fiction that law is objective. Moreover, much
of the moral authority of the law lies in our belief that the gov-
erning rule preexisted the particular dispute to be decided even
if the court overrules earlier decisions to reach the proper result.
In this sense the law can be allegedly trusted as neutral and the
result seen as commanded by the law and not the whim of the
judge. There are societal benefits in a system that is based on
shorten the uncertainty associated with incomplete proceedings, and encourage resolu-
tion when witnesses are still fresh and evidence preserved.
133. One reason for the need for finality in judicial systems is that human beings do
have awareness of the ultimate truth. Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Juris-
dictional Attacks on Judgments, 87 Yale L. J. 164, 187 (1977).
134. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(granting petition for writ of coram nobis to an American citizen interned in a relocation
camp during World War II).
135. Once procedural fairness is established final decisions should have preclusive
effect on later proceedings seeking to reopen them: "But once it has been determined
that due process was satisfied, further inquiry is meaningless. Such an inquiry would be
an attempt to ascertain the 'Facts as They Really Are,' an attempt that cannot succeed."
Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87
YALE L.J. 164, 188 (1977).
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the rule of law. When law changes, the rule of law may appear
more clearly as a legal fiction. Yet, in these cases it is even more
important to employ the fiction and at least speak as if the gov-
erning law preexisted the particular dispute. Perhaps we are
fooling ourselves when we claim that we are ruled by law and
not men, but, if we did not so fool ourselves, it would be difficult
to distinguish the decisionmaking process of courts from legisla-
tive bodies. If courts cannot be distinguished from the legislative
branch, the finality and deference accorded judicial decisions
would be difficult to defend. After all, if court decisions are
openly based on policy considerations, they would be less au-
thoritative, since policymaking is usually the province of the
legislature.8 6
The fiction that judges declare law also allows us to recon-
cile paradoxical notions about law-that law is stable yet capa-
ble of change. To complain when law changes or when judges
apply discretion is simply not to understand the concept of
rules. The concept of rules should be seen as a duality: it is
binding and ultimately not binding at the same time.'$7 In the
long run, the master rule of law is not stability, it is change. In
many areas of the law parties are deemed to have implicit notice
as to the possibility of change. For example, corporations may be
subject to later, different laws whether or not the corporation
had incorporated prior to the change. Rights in the rules of cor-
poration law do not vest. Corporation statutes explicitly or im-
plicitly provide that parties are on notice that the rules may
change.'"" It is difficult to see why this should not apply in the
case of water rights as well. Financial investments made on the
basis of the corporation laws may be just as weighty as those
made in reliance on property rules.
Over the long run, it is society that changes. Rules that did
not change as a society changes could not be deemed the same
rule. A rule and a society in which that rule exists are like the
136. See Chang, Unraveling Robinson, supra note 8, at 74-78.
137. As Judge Edward D. Re stated: "If the doctrine of precedents is regarded as
the champion of stability and uniformity in law, it must, nevertheless, give way to pro-
gress, the needs of society in a subsequent era and the overwhelming considerations of
equity and justice." E. RE, BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT 92 (4th ed. 1974).
138. Such "savings clauses" have become common since Justice Story's comment in
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) advising the states to
enact them.
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foreground and the background of a painting. It is the overall
picture which must be evaluated. If the foreground changes and
the background remains the same, then the picture has changed.
If the foreground remains the same and the background changes
then, again, the picture has changed. A rule must not be viewed
as merely the words in a judicial decision or a statute. Rather, a
rule must be understood in terms of the concrete results it com-
mands upon the life of a society. If society changes, the effects a
rule has on society also changes. Hence, if the background has
fundamentally changed, the rule too, has changed.
VI. CONCLUSION: WHEN THE BACKGROUND CHANGES
In Hawaii, the societal background to the rules regarding
water rights had completely changed by the time of the Mc-
Bryde decision. The rules that supposedly decreed private own-
ership of water were primarily set out by the Territorial Su-
preme Court of Hawaii. These rules were not faithful to the way
Native Hawaiians managed water prior to the coming of the
westerners, a point made by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Rep-
pum v. Board of Water Supply.18 9 Rather, the Native Hawaiians
exercised water rights in a communal manner. The Konohiki
was an agent of the King. He did not "own" the water, as later
post-annexation, Territorial precedents may have suggested.'
Rather, the Konohiki oversaw the allocation, management and
regulation of water among the taro farmers. Since the King held
sovereignty over the waters, similar to the present notion of the
public trust, the Konohiki, as an agent of the King did not re-
quire ownership of the surface water to perform his task.""
139. 65 Hawaii 531, 547-48, 656 P.2d 57, 68-69 (1982) cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2016
(1985).
140. In Reppun, the Hawaii Supreme Court stated:
However, the creation of private and exclusive interests in
water, within a context of western concepts regarding prop-
erty, compelled the drawing of fixed lines of authority and in-
terests which were not consonant with Hawaiian custom.
Thus, the distinction drawn between "rights" and "sup-
plies by permission" or "favors" in Horner, while making per-
fect sense within the western understanding of "property,"
would make no sense at all under the ancient system of
allocation.
Id. at 547, 656 P.2d at 68.
141. Id.
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Ownership of the surface waters was a concept that was use-
ful to the sugar industry. That industry needed to acquire relia-
ble sources of water. The ancient system of reciprocal rights and
duties at the heart of Native Hawaiian water practice could not
form the basis for the firm water contracts necessary for the de-
velopment of the sugar industry. After annexation, Hawaii be-
came a territory of the United States. The President appointed
the governor of Hawaii. The governor appointed the justices of
the Hawaii Supreme Court. Since many of the justices of the
Territorial Supreme Court were not a product of direct local po-
litical participation, coming instead from law firms that served
the sugar interests, the notion of private ownership of the sur-
face water was never judicially challenged.
Statehood brought major political changes to Hawaii. From
the perspective of local residents the political reasons for state-
hood were clear. The citizens of Hawaii held a second class polit-
ical status, having no electoral influence on their governor or the
judiciary. They could not even vote for President of the United
States.1 42 Thus, along with the desire for a popularly elected
governor, one of the political motivations behind the move for
statehood was development of a judiciary more directly repre-
sentative of the population. This is a right held by the citizens of
every state.
Thus, statehood promised to bring change to the racial
makeup and philosophical outlook of the state bench. Given the
fact that a majority of Hawaii's citizens were not white, a popu-
larly elected governor would have appointed a judiciary of un-
doubtedly different color and temperament than had existed in
Territorial days.1 43
The decision to grant statehood to Hawaii was brought
about through the formal constitutional processes: the approval
of Congress, the President and the people of Hawaii. The ex-
142. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Hawaii, 641, 667 n.25, 658 P.2d 287, 306 n.25 (1982)
(Answers to Certified Questions).
143. At the time of statehood, a majority of Hawaii's population was non-white. In
1960, of the total population of 632,772 in the State of Hawaii, 202,230 were counted as
Caucasian, defined to include Puerto Ricans, Portugese, Spanish and other Caucasians.
Caucasians have never constituted a majority of the population of Hawaii. R. SCHMITT,
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF HAWAII 25 (1977).
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pected change in the nature of the judiciary did occur.144 With
different people wearing the robes of judges and justice, there
was no question that a different type of jurisprudence would
evolve. Indeed, this has happened with statehood: the back-
ground of Hawaii had changed.
McBryde v. Robinson was the first water rights case to ap-
pear before the Hawaii Supreme Court. As such, the changes
wrought by McBryde cannot be deemed unexpected. Like the
145 ruetaland reforms that occurred in the legislature, jurisprudential
change should have been clearly forseen by the act of statehood.
To have expected the judicial decisions of the Hawaii Su-
preme Court to simply reaffirm earlier precedents of another po-
litical era would have been unrealistic. It would be similar to
expecting the first United States Supreme Court to blindly fol-
low the precedents of the English law, or to expect that a new
Supreme Court appointed in the aftermath of the election of
President Aquino of the Phillipines, would be required by the
rules of stare decisis to uphold all the precedents of the prior
Court, appointed by former President Marcos.
The Hawaii Supreme Court pointed out in a footnote this
justification for the evolution of state law expressed by Mc-
Bryde.14' The court did not disavow all precedent prior to state-
hood. Rather, it suggested that the affirmative decision on state-
hood by all concerned was an agreement and recognition that
political self-determination should apply to Hawaii.
Finally, it is not only the political structure of Hawaii that
has changed since the days of the Territory. The environmental
situation in Hawaii is vastly different from the days when water
was viewed as privately owned. Hawaii's population has grown
tremendously, straining water resources. In the years following
McBryde, there were water shortages, the implementation of
emergency groundwater control measures147 and the passage of a
144. Presently, a majority (57 out of 78) of the judges and justices in the state judi-
ciary are non-white. The Judiciary, State of Hawaii, ANNUAL REPORT (December 31,
1985).
145. See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, (1984) (uphold-
ing constitutionality of a state law providing for redistribution of fee simple land).
146. See supra note 142.
147. In November of 1979, the Hawaii State Board of Land and Natural Resources
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state constitutional amendment requiring control and protection
of water through a state water code. 148
Moreover, sugar is not the industry it once was. Tourism
has replaced it as the premier private sector industry. Sugar sur-
vives on the basis of federal price supports and thus has fallen
from its status as the state's dominant industry to become an
industry dependent on price supports and import quotas. Given
the hostility of the Reagan administration to continued price
supports, sugar industry officials predict the eventual demise of
the industry.'4 9 In light of the precarious future of sugar in Ha-
waii, the tenacious desire of the industry to retain private own-
ership of water may be a means of retaining control of water for
land development when sugar lands eventually go out to
production.
Thus, as in the political arena, the demographic and eco-
nomic background has changed since the time sugar was king.
Water, once plentiful, is growing scarce. Given the greater and
greater competition for water, public regulation and manage-
ment becomes more and more sensible. The former private mar-
ket system of buying and selling water, premised on private
ownership of water, is no longer appropriate. Water is too criti-
cal a resource to be left to market forces where one can only
hope that the laws of supply and demand will result in policy
that serves the whole community. Hawaii and its self-renewing
water supply system can be analogized to a spaceship travelling
on a journey that will take many generations. There are a lim-
ited supply of goods on board and a finite quantity of renewable
resources such as food and water. Which system of allocation
would work best: a system where resources are collectively
pooled and distributed according to need or a system based on
private ownership of water where those who started with the re-
sources or money are allowed to hoard resources the the depriva-
tion of others?
adopted regulations for the management of groundwater extraction under Chapter 177 of
the Hawaii Revised Statutes (1976). The board proposed designation of the Pearl Harbor
Basin for regulation under the statute. Since that time the Board has designated other
areas on Oahu.
148. HAWAII CONST. art. XI § 7. See supra note 99.
149. E.g., End sugar industry quickly, suggests former head of C & C, Honolulu
Advertiser, July 13, 1985, at A-2, col. 3.
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It is within this context of political, environmental and eco-
nomic change that one must evaluate the rule of private owner-
ship. Such a rule has a completely different impact on a society
that has an endless supply of water than on a society where
there is scarcity. When a situation changes so dramatically, as in
the case of Hawaii, the rules of allocation must be deemed to
have changed as well. Hence, there is no logical basis to the as-
sertion in Robinson that federal courts have a right to force
state courts to continue the existence of inappropriate rules of
law.
In conclusion, there are a variety of reasons why only the
United States Supreme Court should have the power to judge
the constitutionality of state decisions. Some of these reasons fo-
cus on the history of distrust between the states and the federal
government.150 Other reasons, as pointed out in this article, are
concerns of the judicial system as a dispute resolution process.
There must be a logical end where the system must be deemed
to have spoken with finality.151 Finally, as pointed out in the
above section, rules change because society changes.152 Indeed,
150. See D. Currie, The Three-Judge Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. Cm.
L. REV. 1 (1964) (discussing state resistance to review of state decisions by the Supreme
Court).
151. The problems of lack of finality are self-evident:
If there are two "final" answers to a dispute, then neither may
be relied upon until the dispute between the answers has been
resolved. The most obvious candidate to serve as the system's
signal that it has spoken with finality is, of course, the final
judgment. For the final judgment to be effective as the sys-
tem's signal it is necessary that the judgment speak not
merely for the court entering it but for the system as a whole.
Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87
YALE L. J. 164, 189 (1977).
152. This point has been made frequently:
With social change comes the imperative demand that law
shall satisfy the needs which change has created, and so the
problem, above all others, of jurisprudence in the modern
world is the reconciliation of the demands, paradoxical and to
some extent conflicting, that law shall at once have continuity
with the past and adaptability to the present and the future.
Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REV. 4, 11 (1936).
This author has also spoken similarly in another context:
In Hawaii, one cannot expect the property law of Old England
to make sense today. Nineteenth century English law focused
on the paradigm of "Blackacre," a 25 acre (10-ha) estate with
running streams, gardens, and a 20 room mansion. With
Blackacre as model, property law developed in a certain way.
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in the long run, the master rule is change. To view law as un-
changing is to view law in isolation from its impact on society.
To enforce consistency in law, as the Ninth Circuit has at-
tempted in Robinson, results in enforcement of inappropriate
rules. The intrusiveness of the result in Robinson emphasizes
the importance of state sovereignty in areas of traditional state
concern.15 As the Ninth Circuit's reliance on the importance of
protecting its own ruling in Gay may attest,15 the Ninth Circuit
once was the highest court of the Territory of Hawaii.155 Those
colonial days, however, are long gone. The supreme court of the
state of Hawaii should be given the same deference and sover-
eignty intended all state supreme courts under the Constitution.
There may be instances when federal intervention in state court
proceedings is necessary to protect constitutional rights, but in
this case, the Ninth Circuit missed the boat.
On the other hand, the paradigm of Blackacre for Hawaii is
likely to be a two-bedroom condominium in a 20 story build-
ing with 1000 residents on 3.5 acres (1.4 ha). Given the radical
difference between these two paradigms, it is not surprising
that prior rules are sometimes overruled.
Chang, Water Rights in an Age of Anxiety, 77 J. AM. WATER WORKS A. 40, 43 (1985).
153. See, e.g., Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co.v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680
(1930).
154. 753 F.2d at 1473-74.
155. During territorial days, the Ninth Circuit was the highest court of the Territory
of Hawaii in civil cases where the amount in controversy exceeded $5000. Thus, the
Ninth Circuit was the "supreme court" of the Territory of most civil matters. See, e.g.,
Kimbrel v. Territory, 41 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1930).
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